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Local labour market competition and radical right voting: Evidence from
France
DIANE BOLET
London School of Economics and Political Science, European Institute, London, UK
Abstract. How do the economic effects of immigration affect radical right support? The evidence in support
of the labour market competition theory — which posits that the economic threat posed by immigration to
jobs and wages leads to radical right voting — has been mixed. On the one hand, individual-level surveys
underreport economic drivers because of social desirability bias.On the other hand, contextual studies show
contradictory findings due to an over-reliance on units of analysis that are too aggregated to meaningfully
capture the competitive threat posed by immigrants. This paper identifies the influence of labour market
competition on radical right voting at a local level in contexts where native workers are directly affected
by the arrival of immigrants who have similar or higher skillsets. Using an original longitudinal dataset of
fine-grained municipal electoral, demographic and economic data from France over the 2002–2017 period,
the paper provides empirical evidence of local contextual influences of economic competition between
natives and immigrants of any skillset. Under local conditions of material deprivation, measured by the
local unemployment rate, the effect of labour market competition on municipalities’ radical right vote share
is amplified. Moreover, higher radical right support is observed in municipalities with a higher share of any
one of the following groups: low-skilled natives,medium-skilled immigrants or high-skilled immigrants. This
supports the hypothesis that immigrantswith higher qualifications are compelled to accept lower-skilled jobs,
and are thus perceived as a competitive threat to low-skilled natives. By reconciling radical right contextual
studies and research on the political economy of immigration policies, this paper highlights the importance
of a local analysis in detecting the effect of labour market competition on radical right support. This paper
also explains why some local areas are more prone to radical right support than others over time.
Keywords: radical right parties; labour market competition; local context; European politics; political
behaviour
Introduction
The rise of the radical right1 in Western Europe has generated a wide range of theoretical
explanations behind its electoral appeal.2 These range from demand-side theories, with the
study of micro-level processes of individual and attitudinal determinants (Arzheimer &
Carter 2006; Evans 2000; Ivarsflaten 2008; Lubbers et al. 2002; Norris 2005), to supply-
side theories with the investigation of political opportunity structures and electoral systems
(Arzheimer &Carter 2006;Kitschelt 1997).Most seminal studies conclude that immigration
and economic hardship aremajor predictors of radical right performance.Structural changes
of de-industrialisation and globalisation haveweakened the economic situation and status of
low-income voterswho are (or are perceived to be) in direct competitionwith immigrants for
jobs or wages,3 and who eventually respond to such threat by supporting the anti-immigrant
and anti-globalisation radical right parties.
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While this labour market competition (LMC) theory has been commonly reprised
by scholars, journalists and policy-makers, most studies have tested its validity at the
individual- or macro-levels (Arzheimer 2009; Golder 2016; Pardos-Prado & Xena 2019;
Scheve & Slaughter 2001).On the one hand, a large group of individual-level survey studies
has consistently rejected the economic argument that native workers who share similar
skills with immigrants are more inclined to support anti-immigrant radical right parties
(Hainmueller & Hiscox 2007;Hainmueller & Hiscox 2010;Hainmueller et al. 2015).On the
other hand, contextual studies have found mixed evidence linking ethnic groups’ economic
competition with radical right support (Golder 2003; Ivarsflaten 2005;Lubbers & Scheepers
2005). However, both sets of studies have significant limitations inherent to their respective
observational scales: the former are more likely to detect a cultural effect by basing their
studies on self-reported radical right respondents, whereas the latter rely on aggregated
geographical units and variables that mask the potential competition between groups.
Little scholarly attention has been given to the impact of immigration in the local labour
markets of native residents. Yet, this is the ideal scale at which to test the LMC theory
because it is the context in which residents interact with immigrants in their day-to-day
lives. Native workers are directly exposed to and affected by labour market changes in
their immediate surroundings. The presence of immigrants is likely to increase local job
competition and suppress local wages for similar skill groups in some areas to an extent that
is somewhat masked in aggregate indicators.
Following this hypothesis, this paper aims to investigate the effects of LMC on radical
right voting from a local contextual perspective. Does local exposure to immigration affect
natives’ radical right voting differently, depending on the level and type of LMC?
To answer this question, I use a unique panel dataset, which accounts for the French
census data to test the impact that the skill composition of the French-born versus the
foreign-born population has on the French vote share of Front National (FN),France’s main
radical right party, in four presidential elections (2002, 2007, 2012 and 2017) by municipality.
I examine intra-municipality variation in the skills-based composition of immigrants and
natives while controlling for time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity.4
I find consistent results that confirm the presence of LMC at a local level. This effect is
strong and positive for any type of competition,whether it is between natives and immigrants
of low-, medium- or high-skill levels. The effect of labour-market competition on the vote
share of the radical right is amplified in more economically deprived areas. I also show that
the composition of immigrants and natives in municipalities can explain local variations in
radical right support over time. Municipalities with a higher share of low-skilled natives,
or of medium-skilled or high-skilled immigrants, are more likely to register a higher radical
right vote share because these immigrants are compelled to take up low-skilled natives’ jobs.
The contribution is five-fold. First, this paper adopts a close investigation of contextual
factors at the lowest administrative level available, the municipalities. Such a fine-grained
level of analysis allows the evaluation of local contextual effects that directly affect voters,
avoiding the need to infer local effects from national or sub-regional aggregated levels and
thus minimising the issues of ecological fallacy.
Second, this paper extends the analysis of contextual effects on radical right voting by
operationalising economic circumstances with indicators other than unemployment rate
and immigrant population size. Most of the macro-economic aggregate indicators mask
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considerable variation in the types of immigration and therefore do not adequately capture
LMC. The local unemployment rate or size of the immigrant population may be irrelevant
for natives working in occupations facing little competition from immigrant workers.
Despite the large concentration of immigrants, certain areasmight register a low radical right
vote share because most natives are not in direct economic competition with immigrants.
Moreover, most labour economics studies use proxy variables like education that cannot
directly assess the labour market dynamics. Although education is surely associated with
people’s skill level, it is also correlated with cultural tolerance and cosmopolitan attitudes
(Chandler & Tsai 2001;Nie et al. 1996).Cultural intolerance may not directly come from the
LMC between workers of similar skill level, but rather from the fact that lower-educated
individuals are on average more culturally intolerant of foreigners than highly educated
individuals.By focusing on the economic activity and job security of immigrants and natives,
this study contributes to the missing link between immigration and economic conditions in
studies of radical right voting.
Third, this paper brings evidence that actual economic threat related to job competition
impacts radical right voting. Through isolating the economic effect according to the skill
levels of natives and immigrants, I control for the cultural predispositions of immigrants
using education and job activity. Without denying that cultural factors may affect the
relationship between immigration and electoral preferences, the economic effects I find on
radical right voting stress the need for scholars and policy-makers to be less quick to dismiss
economic considerations.
Fourth, this paper provides an explanation for the socio-economic diversity of the radical
right’s voting base, which typically includes both blue-collar workers and the middle class.
Yet, the existing literature contains few thorough explanations of why this may be the case.
By highlighting that local LMC occurs between immigrants and natives of similar skillsets,
I identify one such explanation.
Finally, this paper sheds light on how and why the radical right’s appeal in national
elections varies considerably within municipalities over time. This fine-grained longitudinal
analysis of the skills-based composition of immigrants and natives from 2002 to 2017 shows
that municipalities with a higher concentration of medium- or high-skilled immigrants
are more likely to register higher radical right share. This complements previous research
studies that mostly focused on the composition of the native population, unemployment or
immigration while neglecting the specific skillset of immigrants.
This paper is organised as follows. I first briefly introduce the radical right party family,
and place the present study in the context of recent trends in the evolution of its electoral
platforms and voting base. I then provide an overview of the LMC thesis, summarise the
extant literature on contextual features and radical right voting, and outline my hypotheses.
I then lay out my data, research design, results and robustness checks. The final section of
the paper discusses the limitations and potential implications of my findings.
The radical right
Within the wealth of scholarly research on the radical right in Europe, multiple labels
have been advanced to define this party family. They range from ‘extreme right’ (Ignazi
2003), ‘far-right’ (Halikiopoulou & Vlandas 2016), ‘populist radical right’ (Mudde 2007)
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and ‘radical right’ (Norris 2005). What unites such parties is their nativist policy agenda,
which is expressed by a strong anti-immigrant and nationalist stance (Halikiopoulou et al.
2012;Mudde 2007). The Front National (aka the National Front; hereafter FN) in France —
whose support base is the subject of this article — is prototypical in this regard. This party
counts as ‘radical’ in virtue of its opposition to key features of liberal democracy: it advances
an idealised ethnically and culturally homogenous nation at the expense of individual rights
and equality. It is, however, not ‘extreme’ because it does not share any lineage with the
fascist parties (Norris 2005).
More recently, radical right parties have combined their traditional nativism with an
interventionist economic agenda (Roth et al. 2017). Despite initially supporting economic
liberalism and espousing deregulatory beliefs in the 1980s and 1990s (Kitschelt 1997), over
the last decade these parties have gradually adopted a domestic economic agenda focused
on government spending to expand public services for natives (Schumacher & Kersbergen
2014) and have incorporated protectionist economic positions in their platforms (Roth
et al. 2017). Moreover, most radical right parties have actively scapegoated immigrants as
responsible for taking natives’ jobs and suppressing natives’ wages.
By aligning their economic positions with a nativist viewpoint, radical right parties have
expanded their voting base into new socioeconomic demographics, in particular attracting
economically left-leaning supporters (Kitschelt 2007; Roth et al. 2017). In the 1980s, it was
the anti-state petite bourgeoisie that constituted the main electoral base of radical right
parties (Norris 2005). But with the recent tacking onto the economic left, they have gained
support among the most economically insecure individuals (Arzheimer 2009). Low-skilled
workers and those who are most vulnerable to the rise of unemployment are more sensitive
to the radical right’s ethno-nationalist and anti-immigrant rhetoric. Interestingly, the radical
right’s electoral base also includes middle-class groups: those who are not in the lowest
income stratum but rather a few rungs up (Bornschier & Kriesi 2012; Halikiopoulou &
Vlandas 2016). One explanation for support among such groups is that they perceive a
decline in their socio-economic position relative to that in the past and/or relative to other
groups (e.g., immigrants) (Gest et al. 2018; Gidron & Hall 2017). This article highlights an
additional explanation for radical right support among socio-economically diverse groups
of voters: local LMC between natives and immigrants.
Local LMC and radical right voting
The LMC theory has been one of the most common explanations for the emergence and
sustained success of the radical right. It posits an interest-based form of threat to ‘native’
residents from the arrival of immigrants,which is characterised by the fear of losing jobs and
wages (Pardos-Prado 2011; Pardos-Prado &Xena 2019; Scheve & Slaughter 2001). Echoing
social psychology’s ‘group conflict theory’ (Blumer 1958; Tajfel & Turner 1979), the LMC
theory holds that the economic competition between natives and foreign-born workers
of similar skills pushes the former to cast a radical-right ballot. It thus implicitly assumes
an in-group bias in which natives will always prefer giving a job to natives rather than to
immigrants.5 Some variants of the LMC theory have been developed with an identity-based
form of ethnic threat rooted in the fear of losing cultural resources (Hainmueller & Hiscox
2007; Inglehart & Norris 2016; Sniderman et al. 2004) and more recently with a status-based
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form of threat that arises from the loss of subjective status following economic and cultural
change (Gest et al. 2018; Gidron & Hall 2017).
Yet, while the LMC has been extensively discussed, the economic determinants of
ethnic competition have been supported by weak empirical evidence. The individual-level
studies have concluded that the cultural form of ethnic threat has more explanatory power
(Hainmueller et al. 2014), whereas macro-contextual studies have yielded inconclusive
findings (Golder 2016). This paper argues that these results stem from an over-emphasis
on individual and macro-level studies that cannot account for labour competition, which
plays out at the local level.
On the one hand, individual-level survey data fail to adequately capture natives’ actual
labour market exposure to immigrants. Survey studies base their results on a selected
sample of radical right voters who are more likely to represent the most radicalised voters
because they have to self-identify as radical right sympathisers. Oesch (2008) finds that
only 11.4 per cent of the respondents to the 2002/2003 wave of the European Social Survey
acknowledged having voted for the FN,while the party registered 16.9 per cent of valid votes
in the first round of the 2002 presidential election. Oesch demonstrates that self-identified
radical right supporters tend to hold the strongest xenophobic sentiments and disregard
economic considerations. Although this ‘social desirability bias’ is less important nowadays
given the success, and hence mainstreaming, of radical right parties and the use of online
surveys, it was a significant phenomenon during the earlier part of the period covered by the
present study (2002–2017), and thus remains a relevant point of comparison. In addition, the
absence of attention to the local factors in which electoral decisions are made, for example
satisfactionwith the local environment and public services,can also result in biased estimates
in individual-level analyses.
On the other hand, macro-level studies, because of their aggregated level of analysis,
cannot meaningfully depict local lived experiences of competition between natives and
immigrants. Not only do they include large geographical units like national, regional or
district levels, which mask local dynamics (Golder 2016; Jesuit et al. 2009), but they also
mostly focus on two large-scale macro indicators, immigration and unemployment, which
fail to produce consistent findings. Journalistic discourses and conventional wisdom would
assume that areas with a large concentration of immigrants and high unemployment rate are
traditional radical right strongholds. Yet, while the effect of immigration seems unequivocal
(Arzheimer & Carter 2006; Golder 2003; Lubbers et al. 2002), findings on the effects of
unemployment and its interaction with immigration are mixed.While Golder (2003) shows
that high levels of immigration and unemployment lead to larger radical right vote share,
Arzheimer (2009) finds that the effects do not reinforce each other and Lubbers et al. (2002)
report no significant effect of unemployment.
Instead, this paper draws on theory that highlights the importance of lived experiences
between immigrants and natives in a local environment.Any actual direct economic threat is
most likely to be experienced by natives in theirmunicipality. Immigration at a national level
is unlikely to have substantially affected the wage or job prospects of the average native-
born worker. However, if immigrants are concentrated in small spatial units, then native-
born workers in those geographic areas with similar skills to foreign-born workers might
be affected by their arrival. Local immigration increases the supply of labour competing
for local jobs and may, therefore, increase local labour market pressure (Card 2001). Small
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labour markets influence the relationship between local wages and employment. Since
individuals are more likely to vote according to the changing socio-economic structure in
their immediate environment, it is necessary to investigate panel data at a low level of
analysis.
Also, the economic impact of immigration on radical right voting should be tested while
differentiating between, on the one hand, native workers and their skill levels and, on
the other hand, immigrant workers and their skill levels (Dancygier & Donnelly 2013).
Few studies demarcate the share of immigrant workers relative to native workers for
each sector. Yet, occupation-specific employment statistics are averages, which often mask
considerable variations across occupation-types with respect to the relative share of natives
and immigrants. For instance, there is a gap between the foreign-born unemployment rate
and the native one in Europe (INSEE). Similarly, very few studies specify that actual
economic competition affects individuals differently according to their skill level. Some
rare exceptions have shown material self-interest behind radical right voting, but this has
been limited to the national aggregates (Scheve & Slaughter 2001) and industry sectors
(Dancygier & Donnelly 2013); none of these have looked at the local level.
Malhotra et al. (2013) find that labour-market concerns only drive anti-immigration
voting behaviour when actual economic competition between natives and immigrants is
present. Immigration is expected to have very different impacts on natives’ risk exposure
on the labour market depending on how immigrants affect competition within their
occupational category. Thus, differentiating the native-born and foreign-born populations
according to their skill level is useful to test more accurately the economic competition
between the in-group and out-group, in line with the LMC theory. This leads me to develop
two primary hypotheses.
The first hypothesis focuses on low-skilled natives. The economic effect of immigration
on radical right voting is likely to vary according to how secure native workers feel in
their jobs, and it is workers in the lowest-skilled, most routine jobs who are least secure.
Their employers can more easily replace them, and they also tend to have lower income-
earning potential.Studies on labourmarket outcomes in western democracies have detected
negative effects of immigration inflows on local wages only among low-skilledworkers (Card
2001).That is why I expectmunicipalities with a higher share of low-skilled natives to exhibit
higher radical right support, all else equal.
However, it does not necessarily follow that a larger concentration of low-skilled
immigrants would increase a municipality’s radical right share. The economic effect of
immigration on radical right voting is also likely to vary according to immigrants’ labour
market access. Indeed, due to language barriers, lack of connections and qualifications
that are insufficiently specific to the host country market (INSEE 2009), immigrants are
more likely than other socio-demographic groups to have higher qualifications than those
required by their jobs (Quintini 2011) and thus tend to compete with lower-skilled natives.
For instance, countries tend to have distinctive legal traditions and restrictive regulations
on who can practice law, which pose barriers to the entry of immigrant lawyers into a
host country’s market for legal services. I, therefore, expect that areas with a large share
of medium- or high-skilled immigrants will be more likely to threaten low-skilled natives’
jobs.
Accordingly, my first hypothesis is as follows:
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Labour Market Access Hypothesis: Municipalities with a higher share of any of the
following three groups are more likely to register higher radical right vote shares: low-
skilled natives, medium-skilled immigrants or high-skilled immigrants.
My second hypothesis focuses on similarities among the skill levels of natives and
immigrants.
Local Labour Market Competition Hypothesis: Municipalities with larger shares of
natives and immigrants of similar skills are more likely to register higher radical right
vote shares.
My third hypothesis considers the contextual effect of economic deprivation. The
positive effects of immigration on radical right voting are expected to be compounded
when economic resources are scarcer. Halla et al. (2017) have found that LMC intensifies
when unemployment is high. Poorer economic circumstances are likely to increase job
competition and scapegoating of immigrant populations by natives, as suggested by the
ethnic competition thesis. Higher unemployment also heightens the risk of unemployment
to those workers on temporary contracts as their perceptions of insecurity increases when
market conditions deteriorate (de Witte 1999; Halikiopoulou & Vlandas 2016). As a result,
I expect that a combination of a larger concentration of immigrants (no matter their skill
level) with higher background unemployment is likely to increase radical right voting.
Accordingly, my third hypothesis is:
Contextual Hypothesis: Municipalities with larger shares of immigrants and higher
levels of economic deprivation, that is more unemployment, are more likely to register
higher radical right vote shares.
Data and research design
Themain novel contribution of this paper is to combine municipality-level radical right vote
share with information about skill levels and influx of migrants in France over a 15-year
period (2002–2017). This analysis differs from past research by (1) focusing on the actual
economic threat by differentiating between the various types of occupational activities of
immigrants,6 (2) applying a skill-level classification based on job security and ease of labour
market entry and (3) examining the interaction between workers of similar skill level to
directly assess local labour-market competition when such threats exist.
Case study
Including local observations for a closer examination from a single country helps to avoid
ideological and programmatic idiosyncrasies between radical-right wing parties in different
countries and keep institutional factors constant (Kestilä & Söderlund 2007).Contradictory
contextual determinants of LMC also result from the local idiosyncrasies of cross-national
studies, which ignore the national institutional arrangements and the history of each radical
right party (Mudde 2007).
The choice of France is justified by its obvious pragmatic reasons of data availability, but
there are also more substantive considerations.As the third political force in France, the FN
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is a thriving party that has proven to be successful in national, regional and departmental
elections since 2002. Its leader, Marine Le Pen, has managed to garner more electoral
support in the past five years by softening the openly racist discourse of her father (Evans
& Ivaldi 2013).Despite having retained most of its core authoritarian, nativist, protectionist
and anti-immigrant policies (Stockemer & Barisione 2017), the recent FN and Marine Le
Pen’s ‘de-demonization’ strategy has contributed to FN’s unprecedented electoral gains.Not
only has the FN increased its vote share from 11.2 per cent to 19.1 per cent in the first round
of the presidential elections from 2007 to 2012, but it came second in the 2017 presidential
race (second round) with 21.7 per cent.
The FN is thus an emblematic successful radical right party that benefits from a long-
lasting and growing success. It has been the prototypical party commonly used by researchers
to explain theoretical patterns of the emergence and sustained electoral support of radical
right parties (Betz 1994; Kitschelt 1997; Mudde 2007). Although radical right parties differ
in terms of their precise ideologies, they pertain to the same party family (Arzheimer &
Carter 2006). In spite of their inconsistent findings, all cross-national studies have included
the FN as part of the West European radical right party family, along with parties from the
Netherlands, Belgium, Denmark and, to a lesser extent, the United Kingdom (Arzheimer
2009;Golder 2003; Lubbers & Scheepers 2005). The FN traditionally embodies a successful
radical right party among this party family. One instance of its wider implications for the
West European radical right party family was its ideological refinement of combining ethno-
nationalist xenophobia and anti-political establishment populism in 1984, which was later
reprised by themajority ofWest European radical right parties (Rydgren 2005).The findings
of this study of the FN may, therefore, have important implications for understanding the
local electoral success of other extreme right-wing parties in Western Europe.
Moreover, the case of France is particularly relevant to test the local LMC theory.
First, the recent large immigration influx in France allows us to test the effect of recent
immigration on radical right electoral support. Immigrants represented 8.9 per cent of the
French population at the beginning of 2013 compared with 7.3 per cent in 2000 (INSEE
2016). This recent surge explains why the radical right party has centred its narrative
on immigration. As the arrival of distinct ethnic populations with varying skill levels has
skyrocketed, the potential for political protest against ethnically distinct newcomers to
translate into radical right support becomes more likely (Koopmans & Olzak 2004). The
focus on the economic occupations of the immigrant population has been endorsed by Le
Pen’s rhetoric since the early years of the party. Jean-Marie Le Pen’s xenophobic resentment
was initially expressed in economic terms in 1972 when he stated ‘two million immigrants
equals two million unemployed people’. Despite a recent ideological focus on the religious
attributes of the recent non-European immigrants, the socio-economic features of the
foreign-born population constitute a major issue dimension among FN voters (Evans &
Ivaldi 2013).
Not only has immigration increased in recent years, but there has been also a rise in
qualification levels of immigrants since 2008. Sixty-three per cent of the immigrants who
arrived in 2012 had at least a high school diploma (INSEE 2017a). As of 2015, 10.4 per
cent of immigrants were manual labourers and 11.4 per cent were unemployed, but 14.6
per cent were public servants, private administrative employees, commerce employees and
people working in the personal services sector or CEOs (INSEE 2016). France has recently
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witnessed a rise of foreign workers in IT services, especially from the Northern African and
former French colonies. This influx was facilitated by France’s immigration and integration
law in 2007, which encouraged high-skilled migration in fields experiencing professional
shortages, like the IT sector. The work permit Passeport Talent, created in 2016, has also
facilitated the arrival of entrepreneurs, engineers and managers by extending the duration
of residence to four years for 10 categories of high-skilled immigrants. In addition, recent
immigration has included highly qualified Spaniards and Italianworkerswho fled their home
country after the economic crisis (INSEE 2016).This case study, therefore, enables us to test
the LMC theory for all skill levels.
LMC is expected to be particularly acute in France since most immigrants take jobs
in regulated sectors. As over 20 per cent of immigrants in the labour force are blue-collar
workers or lower grade white collar workers (INSEE 2017a), their presence is more likely
to increase unemployment because wages in these sectors cannot be suppressed below
the regulated minimum. If they were more numerous in the unregulated sector, like in
the United Kingdom, the effect would have been directly felt on wages as no minimum
wage is applied. Manual labourers also tend to face more job insecurity in France than
in any other European countries as around one third of them hold a temporary contract,
whereas permanent contracts are predominantly awarded in medium- and highly-skilled
jobs (INSEE 2017a). These factors contribute to unemployment risk among low-skilled
natives during immigration inflows.
It is also relevant to use the French example because the FN puts the economic
consequences of immigration at the forefront of its agenda. The party has regularly
addressed anti-immigrant positions from an economic perspective as well as from a cultural
one. Since 2012, under the leadership of Marine Le Pen, the FN has departed from its
previously rightist economic platform of small government and tax cuts,and has endorsed an
economic protectionist agenda that prioritises government spending for natives (Stockemer
& Barisione 2017).Marine Le Pen has explicitly blamed immigrants for taking over natives’
jobs and suppressing natives’ wages.
France is also a very practical case study to test the economic competition at a local level
given the availability of data at a very granular scale. Not only does this allow this study
to have dramatically more observations than any other studies for a long period of radical
right electoral success (N = 117,872), but it also increases the theoretical relevance of the
findings, since municipalities are very small geographic areas that are directly relatable to
inhabitants. There is an average of 1,200 inhabitants for each municipality. This means that,
if a certain municipality is characterised as having a large share of high-skilled immigrants,
one can safely assume that most residents of this municipality will live close to high-skilled
immigrants.
Lastly, economic competition is intensified in France because residential mobility is low.
Indeed, the relevance of the local context depends on individuals’ lowmobility. If individuals
are very mobile and easily move between municipalities, then economic competition will
be attenuated. In the 2006–2013 period, the share of households that moved residence
decreased by seven percentage points from 17.8 per cent to 10.8 per cent (INSEE 2017b).
This general mobility decline is similar among all types of housing status (landlords and
tenants).
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Data
The hypotheses are tested with the statistical model in equation (1).
γit = αit + β1 × 1it + β2 × 2it + β3 × 1itX2it + ε (1)
The dependent variable γ is the vote share of the FN of votes cast in the first round
per municipality i in the presidential elections t of 2002, 2007, 2012 and 2017. The data
are drawn from the French Ministry of Interior. In the first round of France’s presidential
elections,7 tactical voting is less prevalent than in the second round (where many vote
for the lesser of two evils). The model that includes the registered FN vote share along
with all blank and invalid votes for each municipality presents similar findings (see in the
robustness checks section). I only account for the presidential electoral results because they
exclude the vote share of the immigrant population, which would have biased the estimates
(immigrants can only vote in local or European elections). Presidential elections are also
more appropriate than parliamentary elections to conduct a fine-grained analysis of local
contextual factors because data on the latter are only available at the voting district level,
which is an aggregated measure of combined municipalities (there are only 577 voting
districts by comparison to 35,287 municipalities). In addition, detailed demographic data
of the composition of immigrants and natives according to their skill level are only available
at the municipal level. Four presidential elections are included to control for time-invariant
unobserved heterogeneity. α is the constant term.
The municipal scale of analysis is the finest aggregation level available, and enables
a precise accounting of local contextual effects on electoral outcomes. Municipal
characteristics are taken from population census data (INSEE). They include the whole
French population and minimise measurement issues. There were 35,287 municipalities
(called communes) in mainland France in 2017. Since the municipalities are registered for
four consecutive presidential elections, the number of observations amounts to 117,872
with 29,709 municipalities.8 Because of their size, big cities like Paris, Lyon, Marseille and
Lille will be defined according to their arrondissements (neighbourhoods). The number of
inhabitants per municipality (including neighbourhoods) varies from 200 to 22,000 with a
mean of 8,100. The contextual characteristics correspond to the 2007 Census for the 2002
and 2007 elections, and to the 2014 Census for the 2012 and 2017 elections. The electoral
results are between zero and five years from a census (for the 2002 presidential elections).
Year and municipal fixed effects are included to control for the over-time changes and
between-municipal variation.9 They enable identification of within-municipality changes in
the composition of immigrants and natives over time.
X1it measures the varying job qualifications of immigrants per municipality i in
presidential elections t. I sort the socio-economic situation of immigrants from the national
skill and job cell approach available in the French National Statistics to measure the
distribution of labour market status. I classify job occupations of immigrants according
to their economic status, hierarchical position and job security. It includes continuous
variables of (1) the low-skilled position,manual labourers,domestic helpers,plumber heating
contractors and routine non-manual employees, such as account clerks, sales workers and
personal assistants with the lowest pay and status and weakest employment protection;
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(2) the medium-skilled position, the white-collar workers like clerical, administrative
and management workers with higher work security, income and prestige; (3) the high-
skilled position, composed of managers, administrators, supervisors and professionals with
higher educational attainment, career security, salaries and status who are more likely to
have permanent and ‘protective’ contracts than any other labour position; and (4) the
unemployed. The detailed classification of occupations according to skill levels is set out
in the robustness checks section.
The status of immigrants includes thosewho are born a foreigner and abroad but reside in
France.Thosewhowere born abroad but who are of French nationality and live in France are
not counted. Those counted as immigrants will remain immigrants despite acquiring French
nationality unlike the category of foreigners registered in the census data. It is the country
of birth and not nationality at birth that is registered. This allows me to include individuals
that eventually obtained the French nationality according to the ‘right of soil’ after 15 years
of permanent residence, unlike foreigners. It also enables me to avoid any compositional
effects by excluding the immigrants with French nationality who can vote. However, it does
not capture the second or third generation of immigrants who are born in France but can
be perceived a threat by the native population and targeted by radical right parties in their
anti-immigrant narrative.
The local sectoral composition of occupational activities is drawn from the French
National Statistics. The low-skilled immigrant rate is calculated as the share of low-skilled
immigrants aged 18–64 relative to the immigrant labour force in each municipality. In the
same vein, the medium-skilled, high-skilled and unemployed immigrant rates are obtained
from the share of immigrants aged 18–64 in the immigrant labour force.
X2it represents the shares of the occupational activities of natives per municipality i for
each presidential election t. These demographic control variables are classified similarly for
immigrants along low-skilled, middle-skilled, high-skilled and unemployed status.
Empirical studies of immigration have obvious endogeneity concerns given that
immigrants themselves choose where to live. Voters who feel uncomfortable with the social
and political atmosphere in their neighbourhood may also choose to move elsewhere, to
more politically like-minded surroundings. White progressive residents might have chosen
an ethnically dense residential location, whereas white conservative individuals might have
decided to move to more homogeneous places to live. But few recent studies attempt to
account for geographical sorting through an instrumental approach of immigrant historical
settlement patterns (Halla et al. 2017), or share of housing stock (Harmon 2017). The choice
of instruments remains questionable since they are likely to violate the exclusion restriction
by affecting the outcome variable.
Also, the origin of the ethnic composition of immigrants is known to affect far-right
voting differently. The recent wave from the Middle East and North Africa by a large new
Muslim population has been perceived as threatening the lifestyle and culture of the in-
group.Most leaders of far-right parties have adopted anti-immigrant political strategies that
specifically target Muslims. Thirty per cent of the foreign-born population is from Maghreb
(INSEE 2016). Savelkoul et al. (2017) identify that not only is ethnic minority density
positively associated with the likelihood to vote for the Party of Freedom in theNetherlands,
but the relationship is also even more significant towards non-Western migrants who do
not mingle with their ethnic neighbours. While recognising the significance of the origin of
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Table 1. Summary statistics
Variables Observations Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
FN vote share 117,872 19.465 8.578 0 72.22
Registered FN vote share 117,872 15.689 6.935 0 59.09
Low-skilled immigrants 118,023 0.791 1.402 0 50
Low-skilled natives 118,023 24.521 6.960 0 100
Medium-skilled immigrants 118,023 0.324 0.756 0 16.667
Medium-skilled natives 118,023 10.203 4.578 0 60
High-skilled immigrants 118,023 0.277 0.768 0 20
High-skilled natives 118,023 8.957 6.924 0 50
Unemployed immigrants 117,872 0.194 0.348 0 25
Unemployed natives 117,872 3.320 1.534 0 40
Unemployment 118,023 2.716 1.717 0 23.856
Immigration 118,023 2.724 3.732 0 66.667
Retired immigrants 117,872 0.754 1.474 0 37.04
Retired natives 117,872 23.696 8.074 0 100
Student immigrants 117,872 0.187 0.535 0 15.77
Student natives 117,872 9.883 10.252 0 52.17
Urbanity score 117,872 2 0.152 0 2
Economic activity 117,872 2.189 0.828 1 3
Share of Mosques 117,512 8.160 4 0.929 29.050
the ethnic composition in determining far-right voting, this study cannot include this ethnic
composition variable due to a lack of data availability at a local level. A French law passed
in 1978 has prevented individuals from being counted by race or ethnicity on the grounds
that it is contrary to the Republican principle of equality.
X1itX2it represents the interaction terms between the different skill levels of natives
and immigrants per municipality t. They first help to evaluate the direct competition of
natives and immigrants of similar skill level (low/medium/high) under varying levels of local
labour market conditions. They then measure the conditional effect of unemployment and
the different occupational categories of immigrants on FN vote share. This helps to test
the contextual hypothesis that immigrant populations (no matter their skillset) are likely to
boost radical right support when unemployment is high. ε is the error term. Table 1 presents
the summary statistics of variables used in my analysis.
Results and discussion
Local labour market competition and radical-right voting
I first investigate the Market Access Hypothesis in Table 2, which presents the linear fixed
effect regression of the effects of LMC between natives and immigrants according to their
skill levels on the FN vote share in the 2002, 2007, 2012 and 2017 presidential elections.
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Table 2. Local labour market competition and radical-right voting
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Variables
FN vote
share
FN vote
share
FN vote
share
FN vote
share
FN vote
share
Immigrants’ skill levels
Low-skilled 0.011 –0.195*** 0.011 0.016 0.005
[0.025] [0.057] [0.025] [0.025] [0.025]
Medium-skilled 0.073** 0.076** –0.035 0.064* 0.077**
[0.033] [0.033] [0.064] [0.033] [0.033]
High-skilled 0.086** 0.084** 0.088** –0.521*** 0.074**
[0.036] [0.037] [0.036] [0.059] [0.036]
Unemployed –0.493*** –0.493*** –0.458*** –0.440*** –1.306***
[0.126] [0.126] [0.126] [0.118] [0.461]
Natives’ skill levels
Low-skilled 0.019*** 0.013*** 0.019*** 0.018*** 0.019***
[0.005] [0.005] [0.005] [0.005] [0.005]
Medium-skilled –0.014** –0.014*** –0.017*** –0.014*** –0.014***
[0.006] [0.006] [0.006] [0.006] [0.006]
High-skilled 0.085*** 0.085*** 0.086*** 0.063*** 0.084***
[0.036] [0.037] [0.036] [0.059] [0.036]
Unemployed –0.086*** –0.086** –0.086*** –0.086*** –0.151***
[0.023] [0.023] [0.023] [0.023] [0.027]
Low-skilled Im ×
Low-skilled natives
0.010***
[0.002]
Medium-skilled Im ×
Medium-skilled
natives
0.011*
[0.006]
High-skilled Im ×
High-skilled natives
0.066***
[0.004]
Unemployed Im ×
Unemployed natives
0.291***
[0.085]
Constant 16.382*** 16.503*** 16.399*** 16.583*** 16.580***
[0.183] [0.186] [0.183] [0.184] [0.193]
Within R2 0.670 0.670 0.670 0.671 0.670
Between R2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Overall R2 0.343 0.344 0.343 0.341 0.342
Municipal FE YES YES YES YES YES
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 117,872 117,872 117,872 117,872 117,872
Number of municipalities 29,709 29,709 29,709 29,709 29,709
Note: Robust standard errors in brackets. ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1.
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The first model shows that the different local employment compositional factors are able to
explain why certain municipalities have a higher share of radical right votes than others over
time.Having a higher share of any of the following groups boosts the radical right support in
a municipality: low-skilled natives, medium-skilled immigrants or high-skilled immigrants.
A 1 per cent increase of medium-skilled immigrants in a municipality leads to an increase
of 0.073 percentage points of the municipality’s radical right vote share, and a 1 per cent
increase of high-skilled immigrants leads to an increase of 0.086 percentage points of the
municipality’s radical right vote share. In addition, the effect of low-skilled immigrants is
insignificant, while the presence of unemployed immigrants strongly decreases the radical
right vote in a municipality.
These findings corroborate the Market Access Hypothesis that medium- or high-
skilled immigrants, and not low-skilled or unemployed immigrants, represent a direct
economic threat to low-skilled natives. One telling illustration is the comparison between
Neuwiller and Villing. These two rural municipalities of less than 1,000 inhabitants are
from neighbouring departments in the north-east of France, and both register a majority
of low-skilled natives. They both share low unemployment rates and a high immigrant stock
(immigrants comprise above 30 per cent of the local population in each municipality). Yet,
in Villing, FN registered a 40 per cent share of the vote share in the first round of the
2017 election, by comparison to a 16.1 per cent share for the FN in Neuwiller. The skill
levels of the immigrant labour force provide a valid justification for different radical right
electoral results.While medium- and high-skilled workers together comprise 40 per cent of
the immigrant labour force in Villing, they comprise only 4 per cent of the immigrant labour
force in Neuwiller. This shows that it is not immigration per se but rather the immigrants’
position within the labour market that affects the radical right’s electoral support in an
area. Unlike previous contextual literature, which used the macro indicator of immigration
(Golder 2003, Lubbers et al. 2002), my model provides a more detailed understanding of
the types of immigration that drive radical right support at the municipal level over time.
Model 1 also confirms the diverse socio-economic backgrounds of radical right voters.
Larger concentrations of low-skilled and high-skilled natives lead to an increase in radical
right vote share within municipalities.Areas with a 1 per cent increase of low-skilled natives
register a 0.019 percentage points increase of their radical right vote share, whereas the
increase is 0.085 percentage points with a 1 per cent increase of high-skilled natives. This
finding is in line with individual-level survey studies that show similar ethnic threats among
low- and high-skilled natives (Hainmueller & Hiscox 2010; Malhotra et al. 2013). Outer
suburbs, where blue-collar and low to medium service workers are concentrated, are FN
bastions. For example, in the first round of the 2017 election, FN received 31.85 per cent
of the vote in Meaux and 24.7 per cent in Melun. Surprisingly, model 1 also shows that a
larger concentration of medium-skilled immigrants decreases the FN vote share. However,
this finding is only tentative since it has not been supported by all models (see robustness
check section).10 Areas with more unemployed natives are also likely to register a lower FN
vote share. This is in line with recent studies that show stronger radical right support among
people a few rungs from the bottom of the occupational hierarchy who perceive a threat to
their position (Bornshier & Kriesi 2012). Because the unemployed natives have no job to
defend, they are less likely to perceive immigrants as a threat.
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Figure 1. Marginal effects of local labour market competition for each skill level on radical right voting.
Models 2–4 of Table 2 test my second hypothesis. They look at the interaction effects of
economic competition between immigrants and natives for low-, medium- and high-skilled
workers on radical right voting. The significant and positive interaction terms for each skill
level suggest that local economic competition between natives and immigrants of similar
skills compounds the positive effects on radical right support within municipalities.11 This
corroborates the local LMChypothesis.Figure 1 shows the interaction effects of local labour
competition between natives and immigrants for each skill level. It evinces the positive
marginal effects of immigrants on municipalities’ radical right support as the share of the
native population with a similar skill level to immigrants increases. There is a positive effect
for all skill levels, but it is particularly strong among high-skilled workers. Brousse is an
example of a municipality in which a large concentration of native and immigrant workers
with similar skill levels (61.2 per cent of the total local labour force in 2017) is associated
with higher support for the radical right: in the first round of the 2017 election, FN came
first, receiving 27.7 per cent of the vote.
Local labour market competition, economic deprivation and radical-right voting
Table 3 examines the third hypothesis concerning the intervening effects of scarcer economic
resources on municipalities’ FN vote share as the population of immigrants increases (for
each respective skill level).The effect is strong and significant nomatter the immigrants’ skill
level. Not only does it corroborate the contextual hypothesis, but the finding is also in line
with the current literature that demonstrates the additive effect of unemployment on radical
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Table 3. Local labour market competition, economic deprivation and radical-right voting
(1) (2) (3)
Variables FN vote share FN vote share FN vote share
Immigrants’ skill levels
Low-skilled –0.305*** 0.005 0.006
[0.030] [0.025] [0.025]
Medium-skilled 0.088*** –0.351*** 0.047
[0.033] [0.056] [0.033]
High-skilled 0.028 0.025 –0.544***
[0.0037] [0.037] [0.073]
Natives’ skill levels
Low-skilled 0.019*** 0.020*** 0.020***
[0.005] [0.005] [0.005]
Medium-skilled –0.012* –0.012*** –0.013**
[0.006] [0.006] [0.003]
High-skilled 0.082*** 0.081*** 0.082***
[0.006] [0.006] [0.006]
Unemployment –0.384*** –0.318*** –0.343***
[0.023] [0.022] [0.023]
Low-skilled Im × Unemployment 0.118***
[0.008]
Medium-skilled Im × Unemployment 0.152***
[0.016]
High-skilled Im × Unemployment 0.196***
[0.025]
Constant 17.338*** 17.173*** 17.272***
[0.186] [0.186] [0.186]
Within R2 0.672 0.671 0.672
Between R2 0.003 0.003 0.003
Overall R2 0.337 0.338 0.337
Municipal FE YES YES YES
Year FE YES YES YES
Observations 117,872 117,872 117,872
Number of municipalities 29,709 29,709 29,709
Note: Robust standard errors in brackets. ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1.
right support (Golder 2003;Halla et al. 2017;Malhotra et al. 2013).Figure 2 shows the impact
of different shares of low-, medium- and high-skilled immigrants on radical right voting as
economic deprivation increases.This finding is in linewith the contextual hypothesis because
it shows a strong and positive trend of immigrant influx (for each skill level) on radical right
voting, conditional on the shares of unemployment increasing.Areas with scarcer economic
resources have more local LMC for all skill levels of immigrants.12
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Figure 2. Marginal effects of local labour market competition and economic deprivation on radical right
voting.
This result follows previous findings that difficult economic circumstances positively
impact the anti-immigrant effect on radical right voting (Golder 2003; Malhotra et al.
2013). In my study, it plausibly explains the radical right strongholds like Hénin-Beaumont
or Liévin in Pas-de-Calais, which have experienced difficult economic transitions after
the shutdown of coal-mining industries and subsequent attraction of white-collar workers
during the reconversion of these cities into service-based areas. The local residents in these
areas are predominantly low- and medium-skilled workers. In the context of high local
unemployment, competition for jobs with immigrants has escalated, and this has translated
into strong electoral support for the FN, with Le Pen receiving over 60 per cent of the vote
in these towns in the 2017 election.
Robustness checks
As a last step, I address some questions that might be asked of the presented results with
several robustness checks. The first model of Table 4 shows that my findings do not hinge
on the exact specification of the dependent variable. The results are similar if I change
the expressed FN vote share per municipality (excluding blank and invalid votes) to the
registered FN vote share per municipality including blank and invalid votes. Including blank
and invalid votes does not affect my results.
The second model of Table 4 presents the squared term of the immigration inflow to
test whether the relationship between the inflows of immigration and radical right support
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Table 4. Robustness checks
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Variables
Registered FN
vote share
Non-linear
effect
By
occupation
Additional
variables
Immigrants’ skill levels
Low-skilled –0.011 0.030 –0.033 0.008
[0.019] [0.026] [0.152] [0.025]
Medium-skilled 0.029 0.079** 0.005*** 0.103***
[0.027] [0.033] [0.001] [0.033]
High-skilled 0.099*** 0.098*** –0.002** –0.065*
[0.030] [0.037] [0.001] [0.037]
Unemployed –0.427*** –0.474*** –0.014*** –0.530***
[0.109] [0.123] [0.002] [0.126]
Students 0.811***
[0.058]
Retired –0.019
[0.022]
Natives’ skill levels
Low-skilled 0.014*** 0.018*** –0.049 0.010***
[0.004] [0.005] [0.046] [0.005]
Medium-skilled –0.008 –0.014** –0.022*** –0.025***
[0.005] [0.006] [0.006] [0.006]
High-skilled 0.055*** 0.085*** 0.089*** 0.101***
[0.005] [0.006] [0.006] [0.015]
Unemployed –0.063*** –0.087*** –0.067*** –0.108***
[0.019] [0.023] [0.022] [0.022]
Students –0.084***
[0.008]
Retired –0.041***
[0.006]
Immigration –0.039**
[0.001]
Net immigration2 0.000
[0.001]
Urbanity score
Towns and suburbs 0.819
[0.659]
Villages 0.620
[0.600]
Economic activity
Service-based –0.177
[0.209]
(Continued)
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Table 4. Continued
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Variables
Registered FN
vote share
Non-linear
effect
By
occupation
Additional
variables
Residential –0.273
[0.194]
Number of Mosques 0.192***
[0.026]
Constant 12.167*** 16.469*** 16.835*** 16.938***
[0.149] [0.186] [0.134] [0.704]
Within R2 0.668 0.670 0.670 0.674
Between R2 0.003 0.000 0.002 0.000
Overall R2 0.352 0.345 0.338 0.374
Municipal FE YES YES YES YES
Year FE YES YES YES YES
Observations 117,872 117,872 117,872 117,872
Number of municipalities 29,709 29,709 29,709 29,709
Note: Robust standard errors in brackets. The baseline estimation for urbanity score is cities. The one for
economic activity is industrial areas. ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1.
follows a curvilinear pattern, as one study previously found a threshold at which the arrival
of foreigners becomes negatively associated with radical right vote share (Charitopoulou &
Garcia-Manglano 2018). These authors posit a non-linear effect since the radical right vote
in a municipality may decrease when there are large inflows of immigrants provided that a
majority of the immigrant population supports a party that is not anti-immigrant. On the
contrary, I obtain a positive but insignificant effect of the quadratic term, which indicates
that my models are not biased by any potential curvilinear effect. This is probably due to
the fact that the immigrant population cannot vote in French presidential elections.
The third model of Table 4 shows the effects of various immigrants’ occupations relative
to the population of each occupation, and not the whole labour force, on municipalities’
radical right voting. The findings are very similar to my previous models, which corroborate
my previous estimates.
Finally, one might be concerned that my estimates are biased by unobserved
compositional and contextual features. The last model of Table 4 addresses this concern
by including segments of both the native and immigrant populations who are not part
of the labour force, namely students and retired persons, and local contextual variables. I
include categorical variables about the level of urbanisation (cities; middle-sized towns or
suburban areas; and rural areas), the predominant type of economic activity (classified as
industrial, service-based or residential areas) and the share ofMosques (only available at the
departmental level) from INSEE administrative data.Although municipalities with higher-
skilled immigrants now perceive a lower FN vote share, the other results are not affected
by the addition of these variables. Among the compositional features, only having a higher
number of student immigrants in a municipality has a statistically significant and positive
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Table 5. First difference model
(1)
Election years (t2 – t1) 2017–2002
Immigrants’ skill levels
Low-skilled 1.113
[0.862]
Medium-skilled –1.513
[2.464]
High-skilled 1.062
[0.958]
Unemployed –1.976**
[0.955]
Natives’ skill levels
Low-skilled 0.079
[0.099]
Medium-skilled 0.072
[0.227]
High-skilled 0.155
[0.323]
Unemployed 0.471
[0.295]
Constant 9.341***
[3.386]
Within R2 0.072
Between R2 0.004
Overall R2 0.041
Municipal FE YES
Observations 36,162
Number of municipalities 29,191
Note: Robust standard errors in brackets. ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1.
effect on the FN vote share. This finding suggests an effect — beyond the scope of the LMC
theory — consistent with the finding that international students represent a symbolic and
realistic threat to natives (Charles-Toussaint & Crowson 2010). The negative and significant
effects of retired natives and student natives are consistent with the economic logic of the
LMC theory in that these segments of the population are less likely to perceive that they
are in direct economic competition with immigrants.As for the contextual features, only the
share of Mosques is statistically significant, which confirms the independent importance of
cultural factors on radical right support (Dancygier 2010).
Another objection that might be raised is the lack of consideration of the effects
of changing local dynamics on support for the radical right. The temporal variations in
immigration and unemployment levels have been proven to affect radical right parties’
performance. Kaufmann (2017) has recently found that ethnic change is likely to increase
C© 2020TheAuthors.European Journal of Political Research published by JohnWiley&SonsLtd on behalf of EuropeanConsortium for PoliticalResearch
LOCAL LMD AND RADICAL RIGHT VOTING 21
radical right support in the United Kingdom, but higher rates of ethnic minorities have the
opposite effect. Table 5, therefore, explores a first difference model, depicting the effect of
changes in the shares of immigrants and natives of each skill level over time on changes
in radical right voting from the years 2002 to 2017. This cyclical approach can eventually
estimate causal relationships between variables. While most variables are insignificant,
the effect of unemployed immigrants on the performance of the radical right is strong.
A 1 per cent increase of unemployed immigrants from 2002 to 2017 decreases the radical
right support by 1.976 percentage points within municipalities. Despite the lack of other
significant coefficients, this finding corroborates my previous results.
Conclusion
This paper provides a novel empirical investigation of the way immigration affects radical
right voting at a local level using the skill composition of immigrants and municipal fixed-
effects. It contributes evidence of an economic dimension to radical right voting.
Using French electoral results and census data over a 15-year period from 2002 to 2017,
this study finds empirical evidence of the impact of local contextual influences of economic
competition on radical right vote share at the local level for immigrants and natives’ skills.A
greater correspondence between the skills of native and immigrant workers in amunicipality
has a positive effect on the municipality’s support for the radical right. Moreover, the
conditioning effects of material deprivation,measured as unemployment, increase the LMC
effect on municipalities’ radical right support; radical right electoral fortunes are likely to be
boosted in areas where the immigrant population (no matter its skill level) increases and
economic conditions become poorer. But this paper also shows that some local areas are
more immune to radical right vote share than others over time, based on their demographic
composition. Municipalities with a higher concentration of any of the following groups
register higher radical right support: low-skilled natives,medium-skilled immigrants or high-
skilled immigrants.
There are some limitations to this study.The lack of local data on the composition of both
natives and immigrants remains a concern since ethnicity can be correlated with the skill
level of immigrants, as found in previous studies (Savelkoul et al. 2017). Future contextual
studies in other countries should take this aspect into consideration,where data are available.
Moreover, actual economic threat could also take the different form of competition for
social welfare provision as distinct from LMC. Further studies could usefully elaborate
on this welfare-based source of immigrant-native economic competition. Furthermore,
some institutional variables with a focus on party competition and the role of the local
institutions could also play a role in radical right voting. Arzheimer and Carter (2006)
have examined the political opportunity structures and found that political institutions
have some impact on radical right voting, but no study has been undertaken at the local
level.
This study has important implications for our understanding of the relationship between
immigration and radical right voting. It reinforces the importance of LMC as one source
of anti-immigrant radical right voting behaviour, which should not be dismissed. As much
as perceived cultural and status threats affect radical right voting, actual LMC at a level
more proximate to individuals matters too. Material considerations are still worth putting
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front and centre of future research on radical right voting. The measurement of economic
competition in multiple units of analysis and across different occupation and industry levels
deserves further investigation.
This study also has important implications for policy-makers in light of the politics of
immigrant integration.Without discounting the cultural dimension, local LMC and resource
scarcity are the breeding grounds for radical right parties to crystallise ethnic competition in
their narratives to garner support. Highlighting the economic issues behind ethnic conflict
lends urgency to state politics to prompt immigration integration policies in economically
deprived localities. This concern is particularly acute in immigrant-receiving societies after
the migration crisis.
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Notes
1 See more on the choice of the terminology in Section 2.
2 While this paper recognises alternative hypotheses behind radical right support, it specifically aims to
revisit the labour market competition hypothesis by adopting an innovative empirical investigation at
the local level with more accurate indicators.
3 Competition can also occur over public resources, but this is beyond the scope of labour competition and
hence of this paper (see more in de Koster et al. 2013).
4 Although alternative theories of radical right voting can be specifically attributed to the French case, such
as local supply factors to explain the different radical right support between the North and the Southeast
part of the country, this paper rather focuses on the intra-municipal factors (and not inter-municipal
factors) with regard to the ethnic composition behind radical right vote share over time in light of testing
the LMC theory.
5 Although onemay find examples in which natives may not necessarily have an in-group preference, these
examples cannot be shown using the methodology of the present study. This paper, therefore, relies on
the in-group bias assumption at the core of the LMC hypothesis.
6 In light of testing the LMC theory, this paper aims to capture the effect of actual economic competition
without discounting the importance of perceived economic threat behind radical right support. See
Stockemer (2015) for more information on this debate.
7 French presidential elections are based on the two-round system,where voters cast a single vote for their
preferred candidate in the first round and the two best candidates compete in the second round if no
single candidate receives the absolute majority in the first round.
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8 The number of municipalities which remain the same over time accounts to 29,709,which represents 15.8
per cent of missing values. It originates from the merging of towns and cities over time.
9 Using municipal fixed effects enables me to hold constant the average effect of the local municipality-
level variables so that none of these variables can affect my analysis. A robustness check that includes
local control variables confirms that these additional variables do not change my results (Table 4).
10 One may argue that medium-skilled workers have less direct competition with immigrants because their
jobs mostly involve service-based occupations, which are more difficult for immigrants to obtain because
they will need to speak and understand the language of the host country.
11 Although the interaction term is not significant for the medium-skilled workers, the figure still shows a
positive conditional effect, which corroborates my hypothesis for this skill level too.
12 Even areas with more unemployed immigrants are likely to register increased radical right support in
the presence of higher overall local unemployment because the latter captures the local workforce as a
whole,which for all municipalities in my study is composed of amajority of unemployed natives.The data
show that, although it is the case that, for most municipalities, the majority of the immigrant population
is unemployed, there are in all municipalities more unemployed natives than unemployed immigrants
among the total labour force.
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